The Theory Seminar meets Fridays at 3:45pm in 7142 Social Sciences
2/28: Vasiliki Skreta, UT-Austin – “Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good”
3/6: Sanjeev Goyal, Cambridge University
3/27: Eduard Talamas, IESE
4/10: Stephen Morris, MIT
4/17: Federico Echenique, Caltech
4/24: David Myatt, London Business School
9/20: Anna Bykhovskaya, UW-Madison – “Stability in Matching Markets with Peer Effects”
10/4: Doron Ravid, University of Chicago – “Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information”
10/18: Niccolo Lomys, Toulouse School of Economics – “Learning while Bargaining: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics”
10/25: Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania
11/1: Ozan Candogan, Chicago Booth – “Optimality of Double Intervals in Persuasion: A Convex Programming Framework”
11/8: Gabriel Martinez, UW-Madison – “Bayesian Persuasion in the Digital Age”
11/15: Pedro Guinsburg, UW-Madison – “Information Design and Sensitivity to Market Fundamentals”
12/6: Dmitry Orlov, UW-Madison – “Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation and Career Prospects”
3/5: Christopher Chambers, Georgetown – “Market Supply”
3/29: Simon Board, UCLA – “Learning Dynamics in Social Networks”
4/12: Rajiv Sethi, Barnard College – “Culture and Communication”
4/19: Brian Swenson, Princeton Electrical Engineering – “Continuous Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games”
4/26: Sofia Moroni, University of Pittsburgh – “Preferences for Mates and the Evolution of Social Norms”