Theory Seminar

The Theory Seminar meets Fridays at 3:45pm in 7142 Social Sciences



2/28: Vasiliki Skreta, UT-Austin – “Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good”

3/6: Sanjeev Goyal, Cambridge University

3/27: Eduard Talamas, IESE

4/10: Stephen Morris, MIT

4/17: Federico Echenique, Caltech

4/24: David Myatt, London Business School

9/20: Anna Bykhovskaya, UW-Madison – “Stability in Matching Markets with Peer Effects”

10/4: Doron Ravid, University of Chicago – “Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information”

10/18: Niccolo Lomys, Toulouse School of Economics – “Learning while Bargaining: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics”

10/25: Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania

11/1: Ozan Candogan, Chicago Booth – “Optimality of Double Intervals in Persuasion: A Convex Programming Framework”

11/8: Gabriel Martinez, UW-Madison – “Bayesian Persuasion in the Digital Age”

11/15: Pedro Guinsburg, UW-Madison – “Information Design and Sensitivity to Market Fundamentals”

12/6: Dmitry Orlov, UW-Madison – “Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation and Career Prospects”

3/5: Christopher Chambers, Georgetown – “Market Supply”

3/29: Simon Board, UCLA – “Learning Dynamics in Social Networks”

4/12: Rajiv Sethi, Barnard College – “Culture and Communication”

4/19: Brian Swenson, Princeton Electrical Engineering – “Continuous Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games”

4/26: Sofia Moroni, University of Pittsburgh – “Preferences for Mates and the Evolution of Social Norms”